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Abstract—Two user secure computation of randomized func-
tions is considered, where only one user computes the output.
Both the users are semi-honest; and computation is such that
no user learns any additional information about the other user’s
input and output other than what cannot be inferred from its own
input and output. First we consider a scenario, where privacy
conditions are against both the users. In perfect security setting
Kilian gave a characterization of securely computable randomized
functions in [1], and we provide rate-optimal protocols for such
functions. We prove that the same characterization holds in
asymptotic security setting as well and give a rate-optimal proto-
col. In another scenario, where privacy condition is only against
the user who is not computing the function, we provide rate-
optimal protocols. For perfect security in both the scenarios, our
results are in terms of chromatic entropies of different graphs.
In asymptotic security setting, we get single-letter expressions of
rates in both the scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure computation allows mutually distrustful users to
collaborate and compute functions of their private data with-
out revealing any additional information about their data to
other users besides the function value. It has many real
life applications such as electronic voting, privacy-preserving
data mining, privacy-preserving machine learning, to name a
few [2]. Essentially, we can cast any distributed computation
task in a secure computation framework, where input data
is distributed among many users, and they want to jointly
compute some function of their data. The study of two user
secure computation was initiated in [3], [4], [5], [6], etc.,
where secure computation was shown to be feasible under
cryptographic assumptions when the users are computationally
bounded. In the information-theoretic setting, a combinatorial
characterization of securely computable deterministic func-
tions is given in [7], [8] for perfect security setting and in
[9] for statistical security setting. An alternative characteriza-
tion (in perfect security setting) using common randomness
generated by determinstic protocols is given in [10], which
also provides lower bounds on the communication complexity.
Kilian [1], among many other things, gave a characterization of
securely computable randomized functions for the special case
where only one user computes the output. The fundamental
problem of characterizing securely computable randomized
functions when both the users compute the outputs remains
open.
Information theoretic tools have been used in deriving
communication lower bounds in 3-user secure computation
[11]. Another line of work, where communication among
users is public and privacy of function value is against an
eavesdropper, characterizes securely computable functions in
terms of information-theoretic quantities [12], [13]. A full
characterization of joint distributions that can be securely
sampled among two users is given in [14].
All these results are for semi-honest users. A semi-honest
user follow the protocol honestly but tries to learn additional
information about other user’s input and output that cannot
be inferred by its own input and output. In this paper we
focus on two user secure computation of randomized functions
against semi-honest users, where only one user computes the
output. The secure computation problem is specified by a
pair (pXY , pZ|XY ), where pXY is the input distribution from
which Alice (user-1) and Bob (user-2) get their inputs X and
Y , respectively, and pZ|XY specifies the output distribution.
Our results can be summarized as follows:
In Section III we consider a scenario where privacy is
against both the users. In perfect security setting, a charac-
terization of securely computable randomized functions was
given by Kilian [1]. We give rate-optimal protocols for such
functions. The rates are in terms of chromatic entropy of
a graph. We prove that the same characterization holds in
asymptotic security setting as well and give a rate-optimal
protocol. Our achievability follows the Slepian-Wolf coding
scheme [15]. In order to use their scheme we modify our
secure computation problem (pXY , pZ|XY ), such that the
modified problem preserves the functionality, and when ap-
plied with their achievable scheme, does not leak any privacy.
In Section IV we consider a scenario where privacy is only
against Alice. We give rate-optimal protocols for both the
perfect security and the asymptotic security settings. In perfect
security setting, the rates are in terms of chromatic entropy of
a different graph, and in asymptotic security the rate is equal
to conditional graph entropy of this graph.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Protocol. Alice and Bob get X and Y as inputs, respectively;
then they engage in a protocol; and in the end Bob outputs
according to pZ|XY . No external eavesdropper/adversary is
assumed. The link between the users is assumed to be noiseless
and private. The users have access to private randomness. They
communicate over multiple rounds, and in one round only one
user sends message to the other. A protocol Π is a set of triples
(ΠA,ΠB ,Π
out
B ), where ΠA and ΠB are next message functions
for Alice and Bob, respectively, and ΠoutB is the output function
for Bob. More precisely, at any round t if it is Alice’s turn to
send a message to Bob, this new message is determined by the
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function ΠA that takes Alice’s input, her private randomness,
and all the messages she has exchanged with Bob so far, and
outputs a message. Similar is the case for Bob. In the end,
Bob outputs according to the function ΠoutB that takes Bob’s
input, his private randomness, and all the messages he has
exchanged so far with Alice. We require that the messages
in each round t belong to a prefix-free code Ct, which can
be determined by all the messages exchanged so far. This is a
natural requirement and allows us to lower-bound the expected
length of the transcript by its entropy.
Notation. For any n ∈ N, we define [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}.
We abbreviate independent and identically distributed by i.i.d..
For a random variable U , we denote by Un the n-length
vector (U1, U2, . . . , Un), where Ui’s are i.i.d. and distributed
according to U . For (U1, U2, . . . , Un) and for some i ∈ [n],
we define U−i to denote (U1, U2, . . . , Ui−1, Ui+1, . . . , Un).
III. PRIVACY AGAINST ALICE & BOB, AND BOB
COMPUTES
A. Perfect Security
We consider a two user secure computation problem speci-
fied by (pXY , pZ|XY ). Alice gets X as her input; Bob gets Y
as his input; and Bob wants to securely compute an output Z,
which should be distributed according to pZ|XY ; see Figure 1.
X,Y, Z take values in finite alphabets X ,Y,Z , respectively.
We assume that the p.m.f.s pX , pY , and pZ have full support.
The users compute via interactive communication over many
rounds. Let M denote the transcript by the end of their
communication, which is concatenation of all the messages
exchanged between them. Bob’s output Z depends on X only
via (Y,M), i.e., Z − (Y,M) − X is a Markov chain. Here
privacy is against a single user, which means that Alice should
not learn anything from the protocol execution about (Y, Z)
other than what is revealed by her input, and similarly Bob
should not learn anything from the protocol execution about
X other than what is revealed by his input Y and output Z.
We say that a protocol for (pXY , pZ|XY ) is perfectly secure,
if it computes the output with zero error and it is perfectly
private against any single user. A formal definition of a secure
protocol is given below.
Definition 1. A protocol Π for a secure computation problem
(pXY , pZ|XY ) is perfectly secure, if the output Z is distributed
according to pZ|XY , and it satisfies the following conditions:
M −X − (Y,Z), (1)
M − (Y, Z)−X. (2)
The Markov chain conditions (1) and (2) correspond to
privacy against Alice and Bob, respectively. It turns out
that not every pair (pXY , pZ|XY ) can be computed securely.
Kilian [1] gave a characterization of securely computable
(pXY , pZ|XY ) with pXY having full support. Essentially the
same characterization holds for general (pXY , pZ|XY ) as well,
and we prove it in our language in Theorem 1. It will be useful
in understanding rest of the paper. We need some definitions
first.
A
X
B
Y
Z ∼ pZ|XY
M
Fig. 1 A two user secure computation problem: Alice and Bob gets X and Y
as inputs, respectively, and Bob wants to compute an output Z which should
be distributed according to pZ|XY . Privacy is against the users themselves,
which means that Alice does not learn any additional information about Y, Z
other than what is revealed by X , and Bob does not learn any additional
information about X other than what is revealed by Y, Z. There are no
external adversaries/eavesdroppers. Both the users can talk to each other over
multiple rounds over a noiseless and bidirectional link.
Definition 2. For any two distinct elements x, x′ of X , we
say that x ∼ x′, if there exists y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z such
that pXY (x, y) > 0, pXY (x′, y) > 0 and pZ|XY (z|x, y) >
0, pZ|XY (z|x′, y) > 0.
Definition 3. For any two distinct elements x, x′ of X ,
we say that x ≡ x′, if there exists a sequence x =
x1, x2, . . . , xl−1, xl = x′ for some integer l, where xi ∼ xi+1
for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l − 1}.
It can be verified easily that the above defined relation
≡ is an equivalence relation. We know that an equivalence
relation partitions the whole space into equivalence classes.
Suppose the relation ≡ partitions the space X as X =
X1
⊎X2⊎ . . .⊎Xk, where each Xi is an equivalence class.
We say that C × D, where C ⊆ X , D ⊆ Y , is column
monochromatic, if for every y ∈ D, if there exists dis-
tinct x, x′ ∈ C such that pXY (x, y), pXY (x′, y) > 0, then
pZ|XY (z|x, y) = pZ|XY (z|x′, y), ∀z ∈ Z .
Theorem 1. Let X = X1
⊎X2⊎ . . .⊎Xk be the partition
induced by the equivalence relation ≡. Then, (pXY , pZ|XY )
is computable with perfect security if and only if each Xi×Y ,
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, is column monochromatic.
Proof: We first prove the converse, i.e., if (pXY , pZ|XY )
is securely computable, then each Xi×Y is column monochro-
matic. For the other direction we give a secure protocol.
=⇒: Fix a secure protocol Π. Let p(x, y,m, z) be the
resulting distribution. Consider an equivalence class Xi. First
we prove that p(m|x) = p(m|x′) for every transcript m and
every x, x′ ∈ Xi. Since Xi is an equivalence class of ≡,
we have x ≡ x′, and by the definition of x ≡ x′, there
exists x = x1, x2, . . . , xl−1, xl = x′ such that xi ∼ xi+1
for every 0 ≤ i ≤ l − 1. Consider xi, xi+1 for some i
in this sequence. Since xi ∼ xi+1, there exists y, z such
that p(xi, y), p(xi+1, y), p(z|xi, y), p(z|xi+1, y) > 0. Fix a
transript m and consider the following:
p(m|xi) = p(m|xi, y, z)
= p(m|xi+1, y, z)
= p(m|xi+1),
where the first and third equalities follow from privacy against
Alice (1), and the second equality follows from privacy
against Bob (2). Since the above argument holds for every
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i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k − 1}, we have p(m|x) = p(m|x′) for every
x, x′ ∈ Xi.
Now take any y ∈ Y . We prove that if there exists x, x′ ∈ Xi
such that pXY (x, y), pXY (x′, y) > 0, then pZ|XY (z|x, y) =
pZ|XY (z|x′, y) for every z ∈ Z . Take any transcript m such
that p(m|x), p(m|x′) > 0, and take any z ∈ Z . Consider
(x, y, z,m) and expand p(m, z|x, y) as follows:
p(m, z|x, y) = p(m|x, y)p(z|x, y,m)
= p(m|x)p(z|m, y). (3)
In (3) we used privacy against Alice to write p(m|x, y) =
p(m|x), and the Markov chain Z − (M,Y ) − X to write
p(z|x, y,m) = p(z|y,m). Note that the Markov chain Z −
(M,Y )−X holds, because Bob outputs Z by looking at his
input Y and the transcript M . We can expand p(m, z|x, y) in
another way:
p(m, z|x, y) = p(z|x, y)p(m|x, y, z)
= p(z|x, y)p(m|x). (4)
In (4) we used privacy against Alice to write p(m|x, y, z) =
p(m|x). Comparing (3) and (4) we get
p(z|x, y) = p(z|m, y). (5)
Running the same arguments with (x′, y, z,m) we get
p(z|x′, y) = p(z|m, y). (6)
Comparing (5) and (6) gives p(z|x, y) = p(z|x′, y). Since the
protocol is correct, i.e., p(z|x, y) = pZ|XY (z|x, y), we have
our desired result that pZ|XY (z|x, y) = pZ|XY (z|x′, y).
⇐=: If Xi × Y , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, is column monochro-
matic, then we give a simple protocol to securely compute
(pXY , pZ|XY ) below. It is easy to check that the protocol is
perfectly secure.
Protocol: Alice sends the index i such that x ∈ Xi.
Bob then samples Z according to pi(z|y), where pi(z|y) :=
pZ|XY (z|x, y) for some x that satisfies pXY (x, y) > 0.
The above protocol may not be optimal in terms of com-
munication complexity. Consider two equivalence classes Xi
and Xj . Let Yi := {y ∈ Y : ∃x ∈ Xi s.t. pXY (x, y) > 0}; Yj
is defined similarly. Suppose Yi
⋂Yj = φ. Then, Alice can
send the same message whether x ∈ Xi or x ∈ Xj , and still
Bob will be able to correctly compute pZ|XY .
For i = 1, 2, . . . , k, define Mi to be the set of all possible
transcripts m when Alice’s input is in Xi.
Claim 1. For some i, j ∈ [k], i 6= j, if there exists x ∈ Xi and
x′ ∈ Xj such that pXY (x, y) > 0, pXY (x′, y) > 0 for some
y ∈ Y , then Mi
⋂Mj = φ.
Proof: We prove the claim by contradiction. Suppose
there exists i, j ∈ [k], i 6= j, and x ∈ Xi, x′ ∈ Xj such
that pXY (x, y) > 0, pXY (x′, y) > 0 for some y ∈ Y . Since
pXY (x, y) > 0, there is a z ∈ Z with pZ|XY (z|x, y) > 0.
Since x and x′ are not in the same equivalence class, we have
pZ|XY (z|x′, y) = 0.
For the sake of contradiction, suppose Mi
⋂Mj 6= φ.
Let m ∈ Mi
⋂Mj . It follows from the proof of Theo-
rem 1 that p(m|x) > 0 and p(m|x′) > 0. Now consider
(x, y, z,m) and by expanding p(m, z|x, y) in two different
ways (similar to what we did in the proof of Theorem 1)
we get p(z|x, y) = p(z|m, y). Applying the same arguments
with (x′, y, z,m) gives p(z|x′, y) = p(z|m, y), which leads
to a contradiction, because by assumption p(z|x, y) > 0 but
p(z|x′, y) = 0.
From the proof of Theorem 1 we have that the transcript
M is conditionally independent of the input X conditioned on
the equivalence class to which X belongs. This, together with
Claim 1 suggests replacing all the elements in Xi, i ∈ [k], by
a single element xi, which induces a new random variable,
which we denote by XEQ. Note that XEQ takes values in the
set XEQ := {x1, x2, . . . , xk}, where xi is the representative
of the equivalence class Xi. Thus we can define an equivalent
problem (pXEQ,Y , pZ|XEQ,Y ) as follows:
• Define pXEQ,Y (xi, y) :=
∑
x∈Xi pXY (x, y) for every
(xi, y) ∈ (XEQ × Y).
• For (xi, y) ∈ (XEQ × Y), if there exists x ∈ Xi
s.t. pXY (x, y) > 0, then define pZ|XEQ,Y (z|xi, y) :=
pZ|XY (z|x, y), for every z ∈ Z . Otherwise define
pZ|XEQ,Y (z|xi, y) := 0, for every z ∈ Z .
Note that the above definition is for (pXY , pZ|XY ) which are
securely computable as per Theorem 1.
Remark 1. Observe that in any secure protocol for
(pXY , pZ|XY ), if exists, Bob will always learn which equiva-
lence class Xi Alice’s input lies in. This is because ∀(y, z) ∈
Y × Z such that pY Z(y, z) > 0, there is a unique x ∈ XEQ
s.t. pXEQ,Y (x, y) > 0 and pZ|XEQ,Y (z|x, y) > 0.
To give a communication optimal protocol, we define the
following graph GEQ = (VEQ, EEQ):
• VEQ = XEQ = {x1, x2, . . . , xk}.
• EEQ = {{xi, xj} : there exists (y, z) ∈ Y ×
Z such that pXEQ,Y (xi, y) > 0, pXEQ,Y (xj , y) >
0 and pZ|XEQ,Y (z|xi, y) 6= pZ|XEQ,Y (z|xj , y)}
We say that a coloring c : V → N of the vertices of a graph
G = (V,E) is proper if both the vertices of any edge {u, v}
have distinct colors, i.e., c(u) 6= c(v).
Claim 2. Every proper coloring of the vertices of GEQ
corresponds to a secure protocol for (pXEQY , pZ|XEQY ), and
every secure protocol for (pXEQY , pZ|XEQY ) corresponds to a
collection of proper colorings of the vertices of GEQ.
Proof: ⇒: Let c be a proper coloring of the vertices of
GEQ that Alice and Bob agree upon. Suppose Alice’s input
is x ∈ XEQ. She sends the message c(x) to Bob; and Bob
can compute the function correctly. Note that there is no error
in computation, because all the vertices that have the same
color as c(x) form an independent set in the graph GEQ, and
thus are equivalent from the function computation point of
view. Privacy against Alice comes from the fact that for any
fix coloring, color of a vertex is a deterministic function of
Alice’s input. For privacy against Bob, see Remark 1.
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⇐: It follows from privacy against Alice (1), that we can
assume, without loss of generality, that any secure protocol
requires only one message to be sent from Alice to Bob, and
then Bob outputs. Fix a secure protocol Π. Note that Π may
be a randomized protocol, but once we fix the random coins of
the users, the protocol becomes deterministic. And because Π
computes (pXEQY , pZ|XEQY ) with zero-error, all the possible
random coins give a zero-error protocol. Fix random coins
~r = (~r1, ~r2) of the users, and let Π~r denote the resulting
deterministic protocol. Suppose Alice’s input is x ∈ XEQ,
and she sends a message m(x) to Bob. Since this protocol
Π~r is with zero-error, the coloring c~r(x) = m(x),∀x ∈ XEQ
will be a proper coloring of the vertices of GEQ. Run through
all the possible random coins ~r, this will produce a random
coloring (c~r)~r of the vertices, where for any randomness ~r,
the corresponding coloring c~r is a proper coloring.
The chromatic entropy HX (G,X) of a probabilistic graph
G = (V,E), where X is the distribution on the vertex set, was
defined in [16] as follows. Below, c(X) denotes the induced
distribution on colors by the coloring of the graph.
HX (G,X) := min{H(c(X)) : c(X) is a proper coloring of G}.
Definition 4. Suppose (pXY , pZ|XY ) is computable with per-
fect security. Then, for any perfectly secure protocol Π, we
define its rate RPS1 to be the expected length of the transcript
generated by the protocol, i.e., RPS1 := E[|M |].
Theorem 2. Any secure protocol for (pXY , pZ|XY ), if exists,
satisfies the following bounds on its rate:
HX (GEQ, XEQ) ≤ RPS1 < HX (GEQ, XEQ) + 1.
Proof: Upper bound: By Claim 2, optimal coloring of
GEQ corresponds to a secure protocol for (pXY , pZ|XY ). So
the expected length of the transcript (which is equal to the rate
of the protocol) is upper-bounded by HX (GEQ, XEQ) + 1.
Lower bound: By Claim 2, every secure (randomized)
protocol also corresponds to proper (random) colorings (c~r)~r
of the graph. Since expected length L(c~r) of any coloring c~r is
lower-bounded by HX (GEQ, XEQ), it follows that E~r[L(c~r)] ≥
HX (GEQ, XEQ). So the rate of communication is also lower-
bounded by HX (GEQ, XEQ).
Multiple Instances: Alice and Bob have blocks of inputs
Xn and Y n, respectively, where (Xi, Yi) ∼ pXY , i.i.d.,
and Bob wants to compute Zn, where Zn is distributed
according to pZn|XnY n(zn|xn, yn) = Πni=1pZ|XY (zi|xi, yi).
It is easy to see that (pXnY n , pZn|XnY n) is securely com-
putable if and only if (pXY , pZ|XY ) satisfies the condition
of Theorem 1. We can define the graph GnEQ = (V
n
EQ, E
n
EQ)
by extending the definition of GEQ in a straightforward
way: V nEQ = XnEQ – the n-times cartesian product of XEQ,
and EnEQ = {(xn, x′n) ∈ XnEQ × XnEQ : ∃(yn, zn) ∈
Yn × Zn s.t. pXnEQY n(xn, yn) > 0, pXnEQY n(x′n, yn) >
0 and pZn|XnEQY n(z
n|xn, yn) 6= pZn|XnEQY n(zn|x′n, yn)}. It
turns out that we can write an equivalent but simpler definition
of EnEQ as follows: we put an edge between (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈
XnEQ and (x′1, x′2, . . . , x′n) ∈ XnEQ if there exists a yn ∈ Yn
such that the following two conditions hold:
1) ∀k ∈ [n], pXEQ,Y (xk, yk) > 0, pXEQ,Y (x′k, yk) > 0.
2) ∃k ∈ [n] and ∃z ∈ Z s.t. pZ|XEQ,Y (z|xk, yk) 6=
pZ|XEQ,Y (z|x′k, yk).
Equivalence of the two definitions: Clearly, the first defini-
tion implies the second one. To see the other direction, let
xn, x′n, yn, z be such that the above two conditions hold. Now
consider an index k ∈ [n] such that p(z|xk, yk) 6= p(z|xk, yk),
and, without loss of generality, assume that p(z|xk, yk) >
p(z|xk, yk). We need to find zn such that p(zn|xn, yn) 6=
p(zn|x′n, yn). Set zk = z, and consider any i ∈ [n] \ {k}.
If p(z|xi, yi) = p(zi|x′i, yi),∀z ∈ Z , then set zi to be
equal to any z for which p(z|xi, yi) > 0. Otherwise, pick
a z such that p(z|xi, yi) > p(zi|x′i, yi) – such a z exists
because the functions p(.|xi, yi) and p(.|x′i, yi) are unequal
– and set zi = z. It follows that with this zn we have
p(zn|xn, yn) 6= p(zn|x′n, yn).
If (pXnY n , pZn|XnY n) is computable with perfect security,
then for any secure protocol Πn, we can define – analogous
to the Definition 4 – the rate RPSn =
1
nE[|M |], where M is the
transcript generated by the protocol Πn.
Corollary 3. Any secure protocol Πn, if exists, for
(pXnY n , pZn|XnY n) satisfies the following bounds on its rate:
1
n
HX (GnEQ, X
n
EQ) ≤ RPSn ≤
1
n
(HX (GnEQ, X
n
EQ) + 1).
Observe that GnEQ in neither the AND-product nor the
OR-product of the graph GEQ. And as far as we know,
no single letter expression of 1nHX (G
n
EQ, X
n
EQ) (not even
of limn→∞ 1nHX (G
n
EQ, X
n
EQ)) is known. See [16] for the
definitions of AND-product and OR-product of graphs.
B. Asymptotic Security
We now consider asymptotically secure computation. Alice
and Bob have inputs Xn and Y n, respectively, where (Xi, Yi)
are i.i.d. and distributed according to pXY . Bob computes
Zˆn ∼ pZˆn|XnY n such that E[||pZˆn|XnY n−pZn|XnY n ||1]→ 0
as n→∞. We also allow vanishing information leakage, i.e.,
the average amount of information any user obtains from the
protocol about other user’s data must go to zero as block-
length goes to infinity. The rate RAS1 of a protocol is defined
as RAS1 := E[|M |], where M is the transcript generated by
the protocol. A formal definition is given below.
Definition 5. For a secure computation problem
(pXY , pZ|XY ), the rate RAS1 is achievable if there exists a
sequence of protocols Πn with rate RAS1 such that for every
 > 0, there is a large enough n such that
EXnY n ||pZˆn|XnY n − pZn|XnY n ||1 ≤ , (7)
I(M ;Y n, Zˆn|Xn) ≤ n, (8)
I(M ;Xn|Y n, Zˆn) ≤ n. (9)
We first show that the set of (pXY , pZ|XY ) pairs that are
computable with asymptotic security is the same as the set of
(pXY , pZ|XY ) pairs that are computable with perfect security.
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Theorem 4. Let X = X1
⊎X2⊎ . . .⊎Xk be the partition
induced by the equivalence relation ≡. Then, (pXY , pZ|XY )
is computable with asymptotic security if and only if each
Xi × Y , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, is column monochromatic.
Proof: Note that in order to prove the theorem it suffices
to prove that every (pXY , pZ|XY ) computable with asymptotic
security is also computable with perfect security. Assume that
(pXY , pZ|XY ) is computable with asymptotic security, which
means that for every  > 0, there is a large enough n and a
protocol Πn that satisfies (7)-(9). As we show in Lemma 2
in Appendix A, this implies existence of another protocol
Π′ (with possibly different transcript M ′) that satisfies the
following conditions for some ′ > 0, where ′ → 0 as → 0.
EXY ||pZˆ|XY − pZ|XY ||1 ≤ ′, (10)
I(M ′;Y, Zˆ|X) ≤ ′, (11)
I(M ′;X|Y, Zˆ) ≤ ′. (12)
Now, for a given (pXY , pZ|XY ), consider the following set.
S := {pMZˆ|XY : I(M ;Y, Zˆ|X) ≤ ,
I(M ;X|Y, Zˆ) ≤ ,
EXY ||pZˆ|XY − pZ|XY ||1 ≤ }. (13)
It follows that the above set S is non-empty for every  > 0,
and if 1 > 2 > 3 > . . . where i’s form a monotonically
decreasing sequence with limi→∞ i = 0, then it can be
verified easily that S1 ⊇ S2 ⊇ S3 ⊇ . . . We prove
in Lemma 1 in Appendix A (using continuity of mutual
information and continuity of L1-norm) that ∀ > 0, the
set S is compact. By Cantor’s intersection theorem, which
states that a decreasing nested sequence of non-empty compact
sets has non-empty intersection, we have that
⋂
i Si 6= φ.
We show, below, that the set S0, which corresponds to the
perfect security, is equal to limk→∞
⋂k
i=1 Si . This proves the
theorem.
S0 = lim
k→∞
k⋂
i=1
Si .
S0 ⊆ limk→∞
⋂k
i=1 Si : This trivially holds.
limk→∞
⋂k
i=1 Si ⊆ S0: Since
⋂
i Si 6= φ, there exists
qMZˆ|XY ∈
⋂
i Si . Since qMZˆ|XY satisfies (13) for every
k in the sequence, we have that I(M ;Y, Zˆ|X)|qMZˆ|XY ≤
k, ∀k ∈ N. Now, the fact that mutual informa-
tion is always non-negative and that limk→∞ k = 0,
we have I(M ;Y, Zˆ|X)|qMZˆ|XY = 0. Similarly we can
prove I(M ;X|Y, Zˆ)|qMZˆ|XY = 0 and EXY ||pZˆ|XY −
pZ|XY ||1|qMZˆ|XY = 0. The latter conclusion implies that
pXY Zˆ = pXY Z , i.e., Bob’s output is with correct distribution.
So we can replace Zˆ by Z and get I(M ;Y,Z|X) = 0 and
I(M ;X|Y,Z) = 0. This implies that qMZ|XY belongs to the
set S0, which concludes the proof.
Theorem 5.
RAS1 = H(XEQ|Y ).
Proof: Lower bound RAS1 ≥ H(XEQ|Y ): We prove
lower bound for protocols with multiple rounds of interaction,
where messages sent by any user may belong to a variable
length prefix-free code. This implies that E[|M |] ≥ H(M).
Since RAS1 = 1nE[|M |], it is enough to show that H(M) ≥
H(XEQ|Y ).
H(M) ≥ H(M |Y n) ≥ I(M ;Xn, Zˆn|Y n)
=
n∑
i=1
I(M ;Xn, Zˆi|Zˆi−1, Y n)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(M ;Xi, Zˆi|Zˆi−1, Y n)
=
n∑
i=1
I(M,Y−i, Zˆi−1;Xi, Zˆi|Yi)
−
n∑
i=1
I(Y−i, Zˆi−1;Xi, Zˆi|Yi) (14)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Mi;Xi, Zˆi|Yi)− n3, where Mi = (M,Y−i)
= n ·
n∑
i=1
1
n
· I(Mi;Xi, Zˆi|Yi, T = i)− n3 (15)
= n · I(MT ;XT , ZˆT |YT , T )− n3
= n · I(MT , T ;XT , ZˆT |YT )− n3 (16)
Note that the second summation in (14) becomes zero if we
replace Zˆn by Zn. Now, since Zˆn is close to Zn, using
continuity of mutual information this summation can be upper-
bounded by n3, where 3 → 0 as  → 0. Proof is given in
Lemma 3 in Appendix A. The random variable T in (15) is
independent of (M,Xn, Y n, Zn) and is uniformly distributed
in {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let M ′ = (MT , T ). Similar to the above
single-letterization by which we obtain (16), we can prove
the following also (proof is along the lines of the proof of
Lemma 2 in Appendix A):
I(M ;Y n, Zˆn|Xn) ≤  =⇒ I(M ′;YT , ZˆT |XT ) ≤ ′
I(M ;Xn|Y n, Zˆn) ≤  =⇒ I(M ′;XT |YT , ZˆT ) ≤ ′
Zˆn − (M,Y n)−Xn =⇒ ZˆT − (M ′, YT )−XT
EXnY n [||pZˆn|XnY n − pZn|XnY n ||1] ≤  =⇒
EXTYT ||pZˆT |XTYT − pZT |XTYT ||1 ≤ ′
where ′ → 0 as → 0. Now continuing from (16):
≥ n · min
pM′ZˆT |XT YT :
I(M ′;YT ,ZˆT |XT )≤′
I(M ′;XT |YT ,ZˆT )≤′
ZˆT−(M ′,YT )−XT
EXT YT ||pZˆT |XT YT
−pZT |XT YT ||1≤′
I(M ′;XT , ZˆT |YT )− 3
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≥ n · min
pM′Zˆ|XY :
I(M ′;Y,Zˆ|X)≤′
I(M ′;X|Y,Zˆ)≤′
Zˆ−(M ′,Y )−X
EXY ||pZˆ|XY −pZ|XY ||1≤′
I(M ′;X, Zˆ|Y )− 3 (17)
≥ n · min
pU|X :
U−X−(Y,Z)
U−(Y,Z)−X
Z−(U,Y )−X
I(U ;X,Z|Y )− ′′ − 3 (18)
≥ n · min
pU|X :
U−X−(Y,Z)
U−(Y,Z)−X
Z−(U,Y )−X
I(U ;X|Y )− ′′ − 3 (19)
≥ n · min
pU|XEQ :
U−XEQ−(Y,Z)
Z−(U,Y )−XEQ
I(U ;XEQ|Y )− ′′ − 3 (20)
= n · (H(XEQ|Y )− ′′ − 3) (21)
where ′′ + 3 → 0 as → 0.
Explanation for (18): This follows from continuity of
mutual information, continuity of L1-norm, and the fact that
(pXY , pZ|XY ) satisfies the characterization of Theorem 4.
Detailed proof is given in Appendix A.
Explaination for (19): Using the Markov chain U −X −
(Y,Z) condition we can further simplify the objective function
I(U ;X,Z|Y ) as follows: I(U ;Y,Z|X) = I(U ;Y |X) +
I(U ;Z|X,Y ), where the second term in the right hand side
is zero because of the Markov chain U − X − (Y,Z). Note
that U −X − (Y, Z) =⇒ U − (X,Y )− Z.
Explanation for (20): Note that for a fix (pXY , pZ|XY ),
XEQ is a function of X . From the proof of Theorem 1 we
have that the transcript M is conditionally independent of the
input X conditioned on the equivalence class to which X
belongs, which implies that the Markov Chain U −XEQ −X
holds. Now (20) follows from the following:
• U − X − (Y,Z) together with U − XEQ − X implies
U −XEQ − (Y, Z):
0 = I(U ;Y, Z|X) = I(U ;Y,Z,X)− I(U ;X)
= I(U ;Y, Z,X,XEQ)− I(U ;X,XEQ)
= I(U ;Y, Z,X|XEQ) + I(U ;XEQ)
− I(U ;XEQ)− I(U ;X|XEQ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 0
≥ I(U ;Y, Z|XEQ)
• Since XEQ is a function of X , the Markov chains U −
(Y,Z)−X and Z− (U, Y )−X imply U− (Y,Z)−XEQ
and Z − (U, Y )−XEQ, respectively.
• Similarly, the objective function I(U ;X,Z|Y ) can be
lower-bounded by I(U ;XEQ, Z|Y ), which is equal to
I(U ;XEQ|Y ) because of the Markov chain U − XEQ −
(Y,Z) condition.
Notice that we omit the Markov chain U−(Y,Z)−XEQ from
the right hand side of (20). This Markov chain is redundant
because Bob always learns XEQ; see Remark 1.
Explanation for (21): It follows from the Markov chain
Z − (U, Y ) − XEQ that H(XEQ|U, Y ) = H(XEQ|U, Y, Z),
where H(XEQ|U, Y, Z) = 0, because from (Y,Z) Bob always
learns XEQ (see Remark 1). So we have H(XEQ|U, Y ) = 0,
which implies that I(U ;XEQ|Y ) = H(XEQ|Y ).
Upper bound RAS1 ≤ H(XEQ|Y ): Our achievability is along
the lines of the coding scheme given by Slepian and Wolf [15],
in which Alice sends only one message to Bob, and then Bob
computes the function. It requires a rate of H(XEQ|Y ). Details
follow: Note that if the function computation is correct, then
Bob always learns XnEQ; see Remark 1. Since we allow small
probability of error in function computation, it follows that
Bob learns XnEQ with very high probability. So we design a
scheme in which Bob, having side information Y n, learns XnEQ
with very high probability (and therefore computes the output
Zn by sampling from the distribution pZn|XnEQY n , whenever
he recovers XnEQ correctly). This is exactly the Slepian-Wolf
problem [15], where a sender wants to send his input sequence
to a receiver who has a side information. Notice that the coding
scheme in [15] trivially satisfies privacy against Alice, because
it is designed for pXnEQY n and is independent of pZn|XnEQY n .
IV. PRIVACY AGAINST ALICE, AND BOB COMPUTES
In this section the setup is exactly the same as the setup of
Section III, except for that we do not have privacy against Bob
here. We can define secure protocols with perfect security and
asymptotic security, and the corresponding rates, RPS2 , RPS2n
and RAS2 , analogous to as we defined them in Section III.
It turns out that any (pXY , pZ|XY ) can be computed se-
curely: Alice sends X to Bob, and Bob outputs Z according
to pZ|XY . In order to state our results, we define the following
graph G = (V,E): The vertex set V = X , and the edge
set E = {(x, x′) : ∃(y, z) ∈ Y × Z s.t. pXY (x, y) >
0, pXY (x
′, y) > 0 and pZ|XY (z|x, y) 6= pZ|XY (z|x′, y)}. For
(pXnY n , pZn|XnY n) we can define the graph Gn in a similar
fashion as we did in Section III.
An independent set of a graph G = (V,E) is a collection
U ⊆ V of vertices such that no two vertices of U are
connected by an edge in G. Let W denote the random variable
corresponding to the independent sets in G, and let Γ (G) be
the set of all independent sets in G. The conditional graph
entropy of G is defined as follows:
Definition 6 (Conditional Graph Entropy, [17]). For a given
(pXY , pZ|XY ), the conditional graph entropy of G (as defined
above), is defined as
HG(X|Y ) := minpW |X :
W−X−Y
X∈W∈Γ (G)
I(W ;X|Y ),
where minimum is taken over all the conditional distributions
pW |X such that p(w|x) > 0 only if x ∈ w.
Theorem 6. For a given (pXY , pZ|XY ), the following bounds
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hold:
HX (G,X) ≤RPS2 < HX (G,X) + 1, (22)
1
n
HX (Gn, Xn) ≤RPS2n ≤
1
n
(HX (Gn, Xn) + 1), (23)
RAS2 = HG(X|Y ). (24)
Proof: Bounds on RPS2 in (22) and RPS2n in (23) can
be proved along the lines of the proofs of Theorem 2 and
Corollary 3, respectively. Now we prove (24).
Lower bound RAS2 ≥ HG(X|Y ): This can be proved
along the lines of the lower bound proof of Theorem 5,
except that we do not have privacy against Bob here. Note
that our lower bound is for protocols with multiple rounds of
interaction. Following the proof in Theorem 5 until (19) gives:
H(M) ≥ n · min
pU|X :
U−X−(Y,Z)
Z−(U,Y )−X
I(U ;X|Y )− ′′ − 3
= n · min
pW |X :
W−X−Y
X∈W∈Γ (G)
I(W ;X|Y )− ′′ − 3 (25)
= n · (HG(X|Y )− ′′ − 3)
By taking  → 0, we get RAS2 ≥ HG(X|Y ). (25) is proved
in Lemma 6 in Appendix B
Upper bound RAS2 ≤ HG(X|Y ): In our achievabe scheme
Alice sends only one message to Bob, and then Bob computes
the function. Achievability is along the lines of the coding
scheme given by Orlitsky and Roche [17]. They showed, by
a random coding argument, existence of a sequence of code-
books with rate approaching HG(X|Y ), in which probability
of error in function computation goes to zero as n→∞. Fix
such a sequence of codebooks. It is shown in [17], that with
high probability, after decoding the message Bob obtains a
sequence Wn of independent sets in G that is robustly jointly
typical with Alice’s input sequence Xn, which implies that
Xi ∈ Wi,∀i ∈ [n]. By definition, if w is an independent set
in G, then ∀(y, z) ∈ Y ×Z , pZ|XY (z|x, y) is same for all x’s
with p(x, y) > 0, which means that z can be computed from
(w, y). So, once Bob, who has yn as his input, has recovered
wn, he can sample zi, i ∈ [n], according to pZ|XY (zi|xi, yi)
for any xi ∈ wi with p(xi, yi) > 0. Privacy against Alice
follows from the fact that the message that Alice sends to
Bob is a deterministic function of her input.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS OMITTED FROM SECTION III
Lemma 1. For every  > 0, the set S defined in (13) is
compact, i.e., closed and bounded.
Proof: Boundedness: Since X and Y are of finite cardi-
nality, it follows from the Fenchel-Eggleston’s strengthening
of Carathéodory’s theorem [18, pg. 310] that it is sufficient to
consider the pMZˆ|XY ’s in S, where M takes at most X ·Y+2
values. Now, since each pMZˆ|XY is a finite dimensional
probability vector, it follows that the set S is bounded.
Closedness: Consider any convergent sequence
(p
(k)
MZˆ|XY )k∈N, where p
(k)
MZˆ|XY ∈ S,∀k ∈ N. Let
qMZˆ|XY = limk→∞ p
(k)
MZˆ|XY . In the following we abbreviate
p
(k)
MZˆ|XY and qMZˆ|XY by p
(k) and q, respectively. To
prove closedness of S we need to show that q ∈ S,
i.e., I(M ;Y, Zˆ|X)|q ≤ , I(M ;X|Y, Zˆ)|q ≤ , and
EXY ||qZˆ|XY − qZ|XY ||1 ≤  hold. Consider the first
term I(M ;Y, Zˆ|X). Since mutual information is a
continuous function of the distribution, it follows from
the definition of continuous function, that if (p(k))k∈N
converges to q, then (I(M ;Y, Zˆ|X)p(k))k∈N must converge
to I(M ;Y, Zˆ|X)q . And by the definition of convergence,
if I(M ;Y, Zˆ|X)p(k) ≤ ,∀k ∈ N, then it cannot be the
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case that I(M ;Y, Zˆ|X)q > . Similarly we can prove that
I(M ;X|Y, Zˆ)|q ≤ . Since L1-norm also a continuous
function, EXY ||qZˆ|XY − qZ|XY ||1 ≤  also follows similarly.
So we have q ∈ S, and this concludes the proof.
Lemma 2. Let  > 0 be a fixed constant. If an asymptotically
secure protocol Πn satisfies (7)-(9), then there exists another
protocol Π′ , where ′ → 0 as → 0, that satisfies (10)-(12).
Proof: First we show that (8) implies (11), (9) implies
(12), and (7) implies (10).
n ≥ I(M ;Y n, Zˆn|Xn)
=
n∑
i=1
I(M ;Y n, Zˆi|Zˆi−1, Xn)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(M ;Yi, Zˆi|Y−i, Zˆi−1, Xn)
=
n∑
i=1
I(M,X−iY−iZˆi−1;Yi, Zˆi|Xi)
− I(X−iY−iZˆi−1;Yi, Zˆi|Xi)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(M,Y−iZˆi−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
= Mi
;Yi, Zˆi|Xi)
−
n∑
i=1
I(X−iY−iZˆi−1;Yi, Zˆi|Xi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ n1, By Lemma 3
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Mi;Yi, Zˆi|Xi)− n1
= n ·
n∑
i=1
1
n
· I(Mi;Yi, Zˆi|Xi, T = i)− n1
= n · I(MT ;YT , ZˆT |XT , T )− n1
= n · I(MT , T︸ ︷︷ ︸
= M ′
;YT , ZˆT |XT )− n1
where T is distributed uniformly in {1, 2, . . . , n}
and is independent of (M,Xn, Y n, Zˆn). So we have
I(M ′;YT , ZˆT |XT ) ≤ + 1.
n ≥ I(M ;Xn|Y n, Zˆn)
=
n∑
i=1
I(M ;Xi|Xi−1, Y n, Zˆn)
=
n∑
i=1
I(M,Xi−1, Y−i, Zˆ−i;Xi|Yi, Zˆi)
−
n∑
i=1
I(Xi−1, Y−i, Zˆ−i;Xi|Yi, Zˆi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ n2, By Lemma 3
≥
n∑
i=1
I(M,Y−i, Zˆi−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
= Mi
;Xi|Yi, Zˆi)− n2
= n ·
n∑
i=1
1
n
· I(Mi;Xi|Yi, Zˆi, T = i)− n2
= n · I(MT ;XT |YT , ZˆT , T )− n2
= n · I(MT , T︸ ︷︷ ︸
= M ′
;XT |YT , ZˆT )− n2
So we have I(M ′;XT |YT , ZˆT ) ≤ + 2.
EXTYT [||pZˆT |XTYT − pZT |XTYT ||1]
=
∑
x,y
pXTYT (x, y)||pZˆT |XTYT − pZT |XTYT ||1
=
∑
x,y
pXTYT (x, y)
∑
z
|pZˆT |XTYT (z|x, y)− pZT |XTYT (z|x, y)|
=
∑
x,y,z
|pXTYT ZˆT (x, y, z)− pXTYTZT (x, y, z)|
=
∑
x,y,z
|
∑
xn,yn,zn:
xT=x,
yT=y,
zT=z
pXnY nZˆn(x
n, yn, zn)− pXnY nZn(xn, yn, zn)|
≤
∑
xn,yn,zn
|pXnY nZˆn(xn, yn, zn)− pXnY nZn(xn, yn, zn)|
=
∑
xn,yn
pXnY n(x
n, yn)×∑
zn
|pZˆn|XnY n(zn|xn, yn)− pZn|XnY n(zn|xn, yn)|
=
∑
xn,yn
pXnY n(x
n, yn)||pZˆn|XnY n − pZn|XnY n ||1
= EXnY n [||pZˆn|XnY n − pZn|XnY n ||1]
≤ .
Now take ′ = max{+ 1, + 2}. Clearly, ′ → 0 as → 0.
To get a protocol Π′ for a given (pXY , pZ|XY ) that satisfies
(10)-(12), we take a random index T ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and fix
(XT , YT ) = (X,Y ). Next we pick (n − 1) i.i.d. copies of
(X,Y ) and fill the remaining indices of (Xn, Y n) by these
(n − 1) copies. Now we have (Xn, Y n) with (XT , YT ) =
(X,Y ). Run the protocol Πn (which is for asymptotically
secure computation) with these inputs. We get the output Zˆn.
Set Z = ZˆT . By the above calculations, it follows that Π′
is a protocol for (pXY , pZ|XY ) that satisfies (10)-(12). This
concludes the proof.
Lemma 3.
n∑
i=1
I(X−i, Y−i, Zˆi−1;Yi, Zˆi|Xi) ≤ n1, (26)
n∑
i=1
I(Xi−1, Y−i, Zˆ−i;Xi|Yi, Zˆi) ≤ n2, (27)
n∑
i=1
I(Y−i, Zˆi−1;Xi, Zˆi|Yi) ≤ n3, (28)
where 1, 2, 3 → 0 as → 0.
Proof: Consider the ith term
I(X−i, Y−i, Zˆi−1;Yi, Zˆi|Xi) in the left hand side of (26).
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Notice that if we replace Zˆ by Z, then this term will vanish.
Now, since mutual information is a continuous function of
the distribution, and ||pXnY nZˆn − pXnY nZn ||1 ≤ , we have
I(X−i, Y−i, Zˆi−1;Yi, Zˆi|Xi) ≤ 1i, where 1i → 0 as → 0.
This is true for every i ∈ [n]. Now let 1 := maxi∈[n] 1i.
Clearly 1 → 0 as  → 0. Similar we can prove (27) and
(28).
Remaining proof of Theorem 5:
Explanation for (18): For a fixed (pXY , pZ|XY ), let us
define the following function:
R(pXY , pZ|XY ) := minpUZˆ|XY :
I(U ;Y,Zˆ|X)≤
I(U ;X|Y,Zˆ)≤
I(Zˆ;X|U,Y )≤
E||pZˆ|XY −pZ|XY ||1≤
I(U ;X, Zˆ|Y ).
(29)
Note that the expression in (17) can be lower-bounded by
R(pXY , pZ|XY ) − 3, because we relax one of the Markov
chains in the definition of R. Also note that R0 corresponds
to perfectly secure protocols. To prove the inequality in (18),
it suffices to show that the function R(pXY , pZ|XY ) is right
continuous at  = 0. In order to show this we define a rate-
region tradeoff corresponding to this function as follows:
T (pXY , pZ|XY ) := {(, r) : ∃pUZˆ|XY s.t. I(U ;X, Zˆ|Y ) ≤ r,
I(U ;Y, Zˆ|X) ≤ , I(U ;X|Y, Zˆ) ≤ ,
I(Zˆ;X|U, Y ) ≤ ,E||pZˆ|XY − pZ|XY ||1 ≤ }.
(30)
For sake of simplicity, in the following we denote
R(pXY , pZ|XY ) and T (pXY , pZ|XY ) by R and T , respec-
tively. First we show that the above defined set T is a closed
set. Then using the closedness of T , we prove that the function
R is right continuous at  = 0, which suffices to explain (18).
Lemma 4. T (pXY , pZ|XY ), as defined in (30), is a closed
set.
Proof: Let PXY denote the set of all conditional distribu-
tions pUZˆ|XY . Since X and Y are finite alphabets, it follows
from the Fenchel-Eggleston’s strengthening of Carathéodory’s
theorem [18, pg. 310] that we can upper-bound the cardinality
of |U| by |X | · |Y| + 2. This implies that the set PXY is
compact, i.e., closed and bounded. For a fixed (pXY , pZ|XY ),
consider the following function:
h(pUZˆ|XY ) = (I(U ;X, Zˆ|Y ), I(U ;Y, Zˆ|X), I(U ;X|Y, Zˆ),
I(Zˆ;X|U, Y ),E||pZˆ|XY − pZ|XY ||1).
Note that T (pXY , pZ|XY ) is the increasing hull of image
of the above defined function h, where increasing hull of
a set S ⊆ R5 is defined as {(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5) ∈ R5 :
∃(a′1, a′2, a′3, a′4, a′5) ∈ S s.t. a′i ≤ ai ∀i ∈ [5]}. Since increas-
ing hull of a closed set is also a closed set, it is enough to prove
that image(h) is a closed set. Since mutual information and L1-
norm are continuous functions of distribution, and image of a
compact set under a continuous function is always a compact
set, and therefore closed. Now, closedness of image(h) follows
from the fact that the function h is a continuous function of
pUZˆ|XY ∈ PXY .
Lemma 5. If (pXY , pZ|XY ) is computable with asymptotic se-
curity, then the function R defined in (29) is right continuous
at  = 0.
Proof: We prove this using Lemma 4 and the fact that
R0 is bounded, which follows from the fact (Theorem 4) that
if (pXY , pZ|XY ) is computable with asymptotic security then
it can be computable with perfect security.
Suppose, to the contrary, that R is not right continuous at
 = 0. This implies that there exists a monotone decreasing
sequence (1, 2, . . .) satisfying limi→∞ i = 0 and a constant
β > 0 such that Ri ≤ R0 − β,∀i ∈ N. Observe that Ri is
a non-decreasing sequence that is bounded above by R0 (and
R0 is finite by Theorem 4). Since every monotone increasing
sequence bounded above is convergent, it follows that Ri is
convergent. Let l = limi→∞Ri . We have l ≤ R0 − β < R0.
Since T is a closed set (i.e., it contains all its limit points),
we have l ∈ T . But this contradicts the fact that R0 is the
minimum value r such that (r, 0, 0, 0, 0) ∈ T .
APPENDIX B
DETAILS OMITTED FROM SECTION IV
Lemma 6.
min
pU|X :
U−X−(Y,Z)
Z−(U,Y )−X
I(U ;X|Y ) = min
pW |X :
W−X−Y
X∈W∈Γ (G)
I(W ;X|Y ).
Proof: ≤: Suppose pW |X achieve the minimum on the
right hand side such that W ∈ Γ (G) and X ∈ W . Consider
any independent set, say w ∈ G. By definition of G, for all
(y, z) ∈ Y × Z , pZ|X,Y (z|x, y) is the same for all x ∈ w
with pX,Y (x, y) > 0. Hence pZ|XY (z|x, y) can be uniquely
determined from (w, y, z) where x ∈ w, and so Z− (W,Y )−
X holds. Since pW |X = pW |XY Z holds by definition, we
have W −X − (Y,Z). Now the inequality follows by taking
U = W .
≥: This is slightly more involved than the similar inequality
(corresponding to deterministic functions) proved by Orlitsky
and Roche [17], because we are dealing with randomized
functions. Suppose pU |X achieve the minimum on the left hand
side such that U −X− (Y,Z) and Z− (U, Y )−X hold. Now
define a random variable W as a function of U in the following
way: w = w(u) := {x : pU,X(u, x) > 0}. We need to show
that the induced conditional distribution pW |X satisfies the
following three conditions: 1) the Markov chain W −X − Y
holds; 2) X ∈ W , i.e., pX,W (x,w) > 0 =⇒ x ∈ w; and 3)
W is an independent set in G = (X,E).
1) The Markov chain W −X − Y holds because U −X −
(Y, Z) holds and W is a function of U . 2) If pW,X(w, x) > 0
then ∃u s.t. w = w(u) and pU,X(u, x) > 0, which implies that
x ∈ w. 3) To prove that w is an independent set we suppose,
to the contrary, that w is not an independent set, which means
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that ∃x, x′, u, where w = w(u), x, x′ ∈ w, {x, x′} ∈ E, and
such that pU |X(u|x) · pU |X(u|x′) > 0. By definition of G,
{x, x′} being an edge in E implies that ∃(y, z) ∈ Y × Z
such that pZ|XY (z|x, y) 6= pZ|X,Y (z|x′, y) and pXY (x, y) ·
pXY (x
′, y) > 0. Consider the above (u, x, y, z). We can
expand pUZ|XY (u, z|x, y) in two different ways. The first
expansion is as follows:
pUZ|XY (u, z|x, y) = pZ|XY (z|x, y)pU |XY Z(u|x, y, z)
= pZ|XY (z|x, y)pU |X(u|x), (31)
where in the second equality we use U −X − (Y, Z). We can
expand pUZ|XY (u, z|x, y) in the following way also:
pUZ|XY (u, z|x, y) = pU |XY (u|x, y)pZ|U,XY (z|u, x, y)
= pU |X(u|x)pZ|UY (z|u, y), (32)
where in the second equality we use U − X − Y and
Z − (U, Y ) − X . Now comparing (31) and (32) and since
pU |X(u|x) > 0, we get pZ|XY (z|x, y) = pZ|UY (z|u, y).
Applying the same reasoning with (u, x′, y, z) we get
pZ|XY (z|x′, y) = pZ|UY (z|u, y), which leads to the contra-
diction that pZ|XY (z|x, y) 6= pZ|XY (z|x′, y).
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